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COLEMAN ENGINEERING CO. fl.
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INO.

[L. A. No. 28824.

In Bank.

[65 C.2d

Dec. 12, 1966.]

COLEMAN ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff
and Respondent, v. NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION,
INC., Defendant and Appellant.

)

[1] Building and Construction Contracts-Damages-Compensation
for Extra Work.-When a contractor, acting reasonably, is
misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued by another
contracting party as the basis for bids and, as a result, submits
a lower bid than he would otherwise make, he may recover in a
contract action for extra work necessitated by the in~orrect
plans and specifications.
[2] Contracts-Agreement to Make Future Contracts.-Generally,
when an essential element of a promise is reserved for the
future' agreement of both parties, the promise gives rise to no
legal obligation until the future agreement is made.
[3] Id.-Agreement to Make Future Contract.-The enforceability
of a contract containing a promise to agree depends on the
relative importance and the severability of the matter left to
the future; it is a question of degree and may be settled by
det~rmining whether the indefinite promise is so essential to
the bargain that inability to enforce that promise strictly
according to its terms would make unfair the enforcement of
the remainder of the agreement.
[4] Id.-Agreement to Make Future Contract: Performance-Obligation.-Where matters left for future agreement are unessential to a contract, each party will be forced to accept a reasonable determination of the unsettled points or, if possible, the
unsettled points may be left unperformed and the remainder of
the contract enforced.
[5] Id.-Definiteness-Price: Building and Construction Contracts
-Construction and Effect.-The effect to be given to a provision in a building contract for adjustment of price to the
mutual satisfaction of the parties in the event of a change in
specifications should not be determined merely from the writ-

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 48; Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 26.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Building and Construction Contracts, - ----§ 37; [2, 3] Contracts, § 118; [4] Contracts, §§ 118, 211; [5] Contracts, § 115; Building and Construction Contracts, § 7; [6] Building and Construction Contracts, §§ 7, 18; [7] Building and Construction Contracts, §§ 8, 18; [8] Building and Construction Contracts, § 13; [9, 10] Damages, § 34; [11] Damages, §§ 29, 34;
[12] Damages, § 42; [13] Appeal and Error, § 1679.
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ten agreement itself, but should depend on the changes
requested.
[6] Building and Construction Contracts-Construction and Effect:
Change.-Where a provision in a building contract for change
orders contains an agreement to agree in the future as to price,
the contract is not invalid from the outset; the validity of the
provision for changes depends on later events.
[7] ld.-Performance: Change.-Under a building contract subject
to change orders and containing an agreement to agree in the
future as to the price for changes, when later changes are
minor or of not great magnitude, the contractor must perform
and obtain a judicial determination as to the price; when the
changes are of great magnitude in relation to the entire contract, the contractor must negotiate in good faith to settle the
price. If he does so, he is not required to continue to perform
absent a price agreement.
[8] ld. - Performance - Sufficiency. - Under a building contract
subject to change orders and im agreement as to the price for
changes, plaintiff-contractor was not required to continue
performance absent an agreement as to the price where the
record supported the court's determinations that defendant's
change in specifications, because of its nature, magnitude and
effect, ran to the entire consideration of the contract and that
plaintiff acted fairly in negotiating the price after the change
order.
[9] Damages-Interest.-Aside from any contractual provision,
interest is awarded as damages by way of compensation for
wrongful detention of money due plaintiff, but the allowance of
such interest only occurs when the sum is liquidated within
the meaning of Civ. Code, § 3287.
[10] ld.-Interest.-A slight difference between the amount of
damages claimed and the amount awarded does not preclude an
award of prejudgment interest, and the erroneous omission of a
few matters from the account or erroneous calculation of costs
does not mean that the damages are not capable of being made
certain by calculation.
.
[~1] ld.-Mitigation: Interest.-Reductions in damages due to
plaintiff's efforts to mitigate damages should not preclude an
award of prejudgment interest.
[12] ld.-Interest-Allowance in Actions on Building Contracts.Although a contract for the engineering and manufacturing of
trailers to accommodate a missile allowed the contractor
to recover the cost of expenses reasonably necessary to prepare

)

[6] See Cal.Jur.2d. Building and Construction Contracts, § 4;
Am.Jur.2d. Building and Construction Contracts, § 4 .

.
"
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settlement claims in the event the contract was terminated,
such expenses would obviously not be incurred until after the
termination of the contract, and the court erred in awarding
interest from the date of termination on the portion of the
contractor's .damages attributable to settlement expenses. The
interest on this portion of the award should date only from
the judgment.

[13] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Failure to Find on
Issues.-Code Civ. Proc., § 634, does not require a finding on
every minute matter on which evidence is received at the trial;
and a court's refusal to make specific findings on every
matter proposed in appellant's counterfindings did not require
a reversal of the judgment where the findings made sufficiently
disposed of all basic issues raised.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying motion to vacate
the judgment and to enter a new and different judgment.
Alfred E.,Paonessa, Judge. Judgment modified and affirmed;
order affirmed.

...

)

Action for damages for recovery of costs in part perform.
ance of a manufacturing and engineering contract as to which
there were significant specification changes. Judgment for
plaintiff modified and affirmed.
Flint & MacKay, Arch R. Tuthill and Philip M. Battaglia
for Defendant and Appellant.
'
Milo V. Olson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PETERS, J.-Defendant, North American Aviation, Inc.,
appeals from a judgment awarding plaintiff, Coleman Engineering Company, Inc" damages in the amount of $289,615.89
plus interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum from December 10, 1959. Defendant also appeals from the order denying
its motion to vacate the judgment and to enter a new and
different jUdgment.
In January 1959, defendant invited bids for the engineering
and manufacturing of 32 positioning or lift trailers and 7
transportation trailers to accommodate its Hound Dog Missile.
'With the invitation to bid, defendant submitted its basic
equipment specifications. Section 3.2.2.9 of the spccifications
contained a description of the "configuration of the payload," namely, "a 36.5 inch dia. cylindrical payload configur-
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ation, the longitudinal centerline of which shall coincide with
the trailer centerline in the plane of the rail top surfaces."
References to configuration of the payload are also found in
other specifications, namely, a provision dealing with load rails
refers to "payloads of various configurations," the intended
use provision refers to "missiles or special payloads for aircraft and missiles" and a provision designated loaded stability states that part of the payload is "at a point 46 inches
above the rail top surfaces. "
The configuration of the payload is important in the light of
the following fundamental engineering principle: The center
of gravity "of an object generally stated is its balance point.
It may be considered in three planes-vertical, lateral, and
fore and aft. Its location depends generally upon the weight,
material and configuration of the object. Its location will vary
among objects of the same weight and material if these configurations are different. All these principles are elementary
among design engineers. "
All of the engineers testified that, if there were no other
specification relating to configuration, an engineer could reasonably interpret specmcation section 3.2.2.9 as locating the
vertical payload center of gravity at rail height. However the
expert witnesses of the parties differed as to the effect to be
given to the other provisions mentioned relating to configu'ration of payload. Plaintiff's experts testified in effect that
section 3.2.2.9 established the center of gravity at rail height
and the further provisions did not establish any other center
of gravity. Defendant's experts claimed that the inclusion of
the further provisions compelled the conclusion that section
3.2.2.9 does not state the center of gravity, and that instead
the specifications must be understood as not stating any vertical location for the center of gravity of the payload.
In February plaintiff submitted its bid to defendant. With
the bid, plaintiff transmitted a preliminary stress analysis
report which interpreted defendant's specifications as locating
the vertical center of gravity of the payload in the plane of
the rail top surfaces. This was filed by defendant's engineers
but they did not read it.
On June 23, 1959, defendant sent plaintiff five" go ahead"
telegrams, informing it that it was the successful bidder.1
Plaintiff then started the design and engineering of the
IThese telegrams limited the liability to be incurred by defendant prior

to formal acceptance of the bid.
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trailers. On July 6 defendant delivered to plaintiff a series of
purchase orders, which, according to the pleadings of both
parties, constitute the contract between them. The purchase
orders state a total price of $527,632 and provide for delivery
of trailers to 'commence on September 15 and contain the same
equipment specifications with regard to configuration of the
payload as found in the equipment specifications in the invitation to bid. The purchase orders provided for "a binding
contract on the terms set forth herein when it is accepted
either by acknowledgment or delivery."
The purchase orders also state in paragraph 9, captioned
"CHANGES," that "Buyer reserves the right at any time to
make changes in drawings and specifications, in methods of
shipment and packaging, in schedules, and the place of
delivery ~ to any material and/or work covered by this order.
In such event there will be made an equitable adjustment in
price and time of performance mutually satisfactory to Buyer
and Seller, but any claim by Seller·for an adjustment must be
made within thirty (30) days of the receipt of such changes."
Each purchase order also states that it is the entire contract,
that no changes are binding on buyer unless evidenced by a
duly executed purchase order, and that buyer may terminate
at any time in accordance with section 8-706 of the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation. The regulation provides, as
applicable here, for payment of expenses and a certain profit
to the subcontractor upon such termination.
The president of plaintiff did not sign and return the copies
of the purchase orders to defendant until July 15,1959. Meanwhile, at a meeting of engineers of plaintiff and defendant on
JUly 7, the engineers of defendant stated that it desired the
trailers to be designed to accommodate a payload center of
gravity 35 inches above the rail top surfaces. When the
engineers of plaintiff stated that it had bid on the contract on
the basis that the specification placed the center of gravity at
rail height and had so indicated in its stress report attached to
its bid, defendant's engineers admitted that they had not read
that report. Plaintiff's engineers also stated at that time that
their work had been based on the assumption of a vertical
center of gravity at rail height, that the changing of the center
of gravity would entail an increase in costs and a delay in
schedule, and that plaintiff desired a change in specifications
defining the location of the center of gravity if defendant
wanted it at a place other than the top of the load rails. The
engineer in charge for defendant requested that work continue

)
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on the trailers and stated that changes in the specifications
would be forthcoming.
Several meetings were thereafter held between engineers of
the parties, and several proposed changes in specifications
were prepared. On October 5, 1959, defendant supplied plaintiff with a telegraphic change in specifications wherein the
center of gravity was located at 35 inches above rail height.
The change in specifications caused a significant change in
the engineering, design and cost of construction; the increase
in costs was at least $257,000. Upon receipt of the telegraphic
change of October 5, plaintiff requested an adjustment in price
and time for performance before continuing performance.
Plaintiff sought recovery of costs expended to the date of the
receipt of the telegraphic change and the reasonable expenses
of constructing the trailers in accordance with the changed
specifications. Plaintiff first sought to raise the contract price
to over a million dollars, and also offered as an alternative to
change the contractual arrangement from "fixed-price to fixedprice with redetermination or to a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee at a
point to be agreed upon." Plaintiff urged that repricing of
the contract was essential because of the long delays while
waiting for the change order and the numerous starts and
stops caused thereby, interim price increases by vendors,
changes in the anticipated number of units to be ordered, and
the many conferences as to the changes. During these negotiations the position of defendant was that plaintiff had made a
mistake by underbidding and was looking to defendant to
"bail" it out. Defendant refused to pay more than a 10
percent increase ~n the contract price, an increase of approximately $52,000 which would have raised the contract price to
approximately $580,000.
Plaintiff ~ a letter to defendant took the position that
continuation of the contract without obtaining its price for the
changes could mean financial disaster to it and that unless a
settlement could. be reached on the bases it had suggested it
would have to stop work on November 5, 1959, and it then
would seek recovery under the provision of the contract
providing for" Termination for Convenience. "
Defendant replied that under the purchase orders plaintiff
was entitled only to the costs of the changes and that if plaintiff terminated work, the termination would not constitute a
termination for convenience but a breach. As a result of subsf'quent conferences, plaintiff did not stop work on November i3,

402
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but instead submitted a new cost breakdown of the contract as
changed. In a letter accompanying' this breakdown dated
November 10, 1959, plaintiff took the position that it would
not agree to arriving at a price on the theory of a comparison
between the cost breakdown of every item before the change as
compared to a cost breakdown of every item after the change.
The letter explained this position as follows: As to engineering costs, it had from the beginning recognized that a ehange
was necessary and approached the problem of design from that
viewpoint, but the exact details of the ehange were unknown.
Because of the necessary stoppages and reanalyzation costs
increased, and after the change was made the engineers were
required to reanalyze every part going into the trailer to
determine whether it had to be changed. As to manufacturing,
plaintiff took the position that in making its bid it had
obtained price estimates from its vendors, that the bid was
based upon these quotations, that because of the impending
change order and to save money it was unable to place its
orders with its vendors until the change was decided upon,
and that in the interim there were changes in prices on a
number of articles, including some that were not affected by
the change c;>rders.
.
In this letter plaintiff also offered to permit a government
audit office to examine the costs and to abide by its decision.
The letter also states that plaintiff will continue its engineering work to completion but will otherwise stop work.
Defendant rejected plaintiff's price breakdown as inadequate and stated that it was willing to negotiate further but
that unless plaintiff resumed work by November 18, it would
be compelled to conclude that plaintiff had breached the
contract and would seek procurement of the trailers elsewhere.
After plaintiff refused to continue further without determination of the price for the change order, defendant on November
19 wired that it considered the work stoppage a breach and
would seek to procure the trailers elsewhere.
On December 1 and 4, plaintiff made further offers substantially reducing the price based on lower cost estimates and
some changes in the design of the trailers. Defendant replied
011 December 8, that it had placed contracts at another source
for the delivery of the trailers and could not consider those
offers.
Defendant contracted with another firm for construction of
the trailers at a cost of over $800,000, some $28,000 more than
the amount of plaintiff's last offer. On March 29, 1960, plain-
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tiff submitted to defendant its termination claim of
$296,783.03 for expenses incurred in performing the contract.
The trial court determined that the contract was entered
into on July 6, 1959, when defendant delivered the purchase.
orders to plaintiff, that the specifications of the contract place
the center of gravity of the payload at rail height, that the
engineers of defendant after the conference on July 7
requested plaintiff to continue work and said change orders
would be forthcoming, that the change in specifications caused
a significant change in the engineering, design and construction of the trailer units which cost at least $257,000, that
plaintiff after receipt of the change acted in good faith in
seeking an adjustment in the contract price before proceeding
further in performance of the contract, that in the circumstances of this case the covenant providing for changes and
adjustment of price was not an independent covenant but had
to be complied with by the parties before defendant could
require plaintiff to proceed with the contract, that the change
because of its nature, magnitude and effect, ran to the entire
consideration of the contract, that defendant knew that plaintiff's request for an adjustment in price :was not unreasonable,
that plaintiff and not defendant acted fairly in the negotiations after the change order, that any mistake made during
the execution of the contract was a mistake caused by defendant not plaintiff, that plaintiff did not underbid in its initial
bid, and that plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of
$289,615.89. The court denied recovery on a counterclaim by
defendant in which it had sought to recover the difference
between the' contract price with plaintiff and the cost of
obtaining the trailers elsewhere, $381,109.74.
Defendant attacks the determination of the trial court that
the contract as originally entered into placed the vertical
center of gravity of the payload at rail height. It is also
contended that the trial court's finding that the contract came
into existence on JUly 6, 1959, is not supported by the evidence, and that the undisputed evidence establishes that the
contract did not come into existence until Ju1y 15, which wa~
after defendant '8 engineers notified plaintiff that the center of
gravity would be at a point some 35 inches above the rail
height.
It is unnecessary to discuss in detail these contentions
because, first, other facts found by the trial court and
supported by the evidence require a conclusion that the
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contract as originally entered into did not provide for a verti.
cal center of gravity at a point 35 inches above rail height,
and, second, it is immaterial whether the contract came into
existence on July 6 or July 15.
[1] A contractor who, acting reasonably, is misled by
incorrect plans and specifications issued by another contracting party as the basis for bids and who, as a result, submits a
bid which is lower than he would otherwise have made may
recover in a contract action for extra work necessitated by the
incorrect plans and specifications. (Cf. Souza &; McCue
Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 508, 510 [20 Cal.
Rptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338] ; MacIsaac &; Menke Co. v. Cardoz
Corp., 193 Cal.App.2d 661,669 [14 Cal.Rptr. 523].)
There is nothing in the written specifications or contract
which could be reasonably interpreted to require the· vertical
center of gravity at 35 inches above the rail height, and
defendant does not urge that the specifications or written
contract so require, but merely claims that the specifications
viewed as a whole are ambiguous. Furthermore, even assuming
that the inspection of the missile by engineers of plaintiff
might indicate that the vertical center of gravity of the payload was not at rail height, the inspection could not be held to
require plaintiff, in the absence of further information, to
locate the center of gravity at a point 35 inches above the rails
or any substantial distance above the rails.
There was no understanding reached by the parties prior to
JUly 15 fixing the vertical center of gravity of the payload at
on point 35 inches above the rail height. At the meeting on July
7, defendant made clear its position that it desired such a
location, and plaintiff made clear its position that its bid had
been based on a vertical center of gravity at rail height, that
its stress analysis report had so indicated, that the work so far
done had been based on a vertical center of gravity at rail
height, and that adjustment to a different height would
require substantial changes.
The court found, and the finding is supported by the evidence, that after the July 7 meeting "defendant requested
plaintiff to contiuue working on the project, the subject matter
of the contract, and stated that changed specifications would
be forthcoming from defendant to plaintiff." It is clear that
after the so-called mistake was discovered defendant did not
seek to withdraw its purchase orders but to the contrary took
the position that performance should continue and that
changes would be made in the specifications. The purchase
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orders, as we have seen, permitted defendant to require
changes with a mutually satisfactory adjustment in price and
time for performance, and under the circumstances it must be
concluded that the contract entered into by the parties did not
provide for a vertical center of gravity 35 inches above the
rails and that the fixing of the vertical center of gravity at a
location satisfactory to defendant was to be accomplished by a
change in specific a tions.
The next question is whether plaintiff was entitled to stop
work until an agreement was reached on the price to be
charged because of the change order. This question primarily
involves the effect to be given to the provisions of section 9 of
the purchase orders that defendant may make changes in the
specifications and that in "such event there will be made an
equitable adjustment in price and time of performance mutually satisfactory to Buyer and Seller." (Italics added.) ,
[2] The general rule is that if an "essential element" of a
promise is reserved for the future agreement of both parties,
the promise gives rise to no legal obligation until such future
agreement is made. (Ablett v. Olauson, 43 Ca1.2d 280, 284-285
[272 P.2d 753]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Oourt, 51
Ca1.2d 423, 433 [333 P .2d 745].) [3] "The enforceability
of a contract containing a promise to agree depends upon the
relative importance and the severability of the matter left to
the future; it is a question of degree and may be settled by
determining whether the indefinite promise is so essential to
the bargain that inability to enforce that promise strictly
according to its terms would make unfair the enforcement of
the remainder of the agreement. [Citations.] [4] Where the
matters left for future agreement are unessential, each party
will be forced to accept a reasonable determination of the
unsettled point or if possible the unsettled point may be left
unperformed and the remainder of the contract be enforced.
[Citations.]" (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Oourt, supra,
51 Ca1.2d 423,433; Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 59
Ca1.2d 159,194 [28 Cal.Rptr. 724,379 P.2d 28].)
Application of these rules to provisions governing change
orders in a building contract where the price for the changes
is subject to mutual satisfaction is difficult because ordinarily
it cannot be determined at the time of entry into the agreement or until change orders are sought whether the provisions
governing change orders are or are not an "essential element" of the agreement. It is undesirable to hold the entire
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contract unenforceable when there may be no need for change \
orders or the change orders are insubstantial in relation to the
balance of the agreement. On the other hand, where the change
orders are substantial in relation to the remainder of the
agreement so that the provision for change orders becomes an
"essential element" of the contract, it is often unfair to
require a party to perform while awaiting a reasonable determination as to price. The change orders may require matters
which the contractor may not be equipped to produce except at
an unreasonable cost or may require such an increase in costs
that progress payments may be essential for the protection of
the contractor. The last alternative suggested above, leaving
the unsettled point unperformed and enforcing the balance of
the contract, would obviously result in unfairness to a contractor where he is compelled to incur substantial expenses as a
result of change orders and denied any payment.
[5] Because the relative importance of the change provision of the agreement cannot be known until changes are
sought, we are satisfied that the effect to be given to the provision for adjustment of price to the mutual satisfaction of the
parties should not be determined merely from the written
agreement. itself but should depend upon the changes requested. [6] Accordingly, where a provision for changes
contains an agreement to agree in the future as to price,the
contract is not invalid from the outset, and the validity of the
provision for changes depends upon subsequent events. [7] Undoubtedly, if the subsequent changes are minor or of not
great magnitude the contractor must perform and obtain a
subsequent judicial determination as to the price of the
changes. However, where the changes are of great magnitude
in relation to the entire contract, the contractor must negotiate
in good faith to settle the price (cf. Comunale v. Traders &;
General Ins. Co., 50 Ca1.2d 654, 658 [328 P.2d 198] [there is
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract] ), and where he has done so, he is not required to
continue performance in the absence of an agreement as to the
prIce.
Cases relied upon by defendant, such as Snow Mountain W.
&; P. Co. v. Kraner, 191 Cal. 312, 316-318 [216 P. 589], are not
controlling because change order clauses therein either did not
contain a provision that the price of the change would be fixed
to the mutual satisfaction of the parties but instead contained
a formula for determination of the price (cost plus a percentage of cost) or, if the price was to be fixed by. future
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agreement, there was also an express provision to continue
performance in the absence of the agreement.
[8] In the instant case, the court concluded that the
challge, because of its nature, magnitude, and effect, ran to the
entire consideration of the contract (see Medico-Dental etc.
Co. v. Horton &- Oonverse, 21 Ca1.2d 411,419 [132 P.2d 457]),
and that plaintiff acted fairly in its negotiations after the
change order. Both of these determinations are supported by
the record. For this reason plaintiff was not required to
continue performance in the absence of an agreement as to
price.
Defendant makes a number of attacks on the amount of
damages awarded. Some of these contentions are based on the
claim that plaintiff's original bid would have resulted in a loss
to it. This contention is witJtout merit. The court found that
plaintiff did not underbid, and there is substantial evidence
that had the original contract been performed without change,
plaintiff would have made a substantial profit.
Defendant also urges that the damages awarded violate subparagraph (e) of section 8-706 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (incorporated by reference into the purchase
orders), which limits recovery of the seller to the contract
price. It is asserted that the damages awarded with regard to
two of the purchase orders exceed the contract price of those
orders. However, the conduct of the parties and their pleadings show that the purchase orders did not create severable
contracts but constituted only a single contract for $527,632.
The damages awarded were well below that figure.
Defendant next attacks the award of interest. Section 3287
of the Civil Code provides that any person who is entitled to
recover" damages certain, or capable of being made certain by
calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him
upon a particular day," is entitled to recover interest thereon.
[9] Aside from any contractual provision, interest is
awarded as damages by way of compensation for wrongful
detention of money due plaintiff. Of course, the allowance of
such interest only occurs when the sum is liquidated within
the meaning of section 3287. (Amco Oonstr. Co. v. Ocean View
Estates, Inc., 169 Cal.App.2d 235,238 [337 P.2d 146].)
It has been held that in a cost-plus building contract the
amount due is capable of ascertainment by calculation so that
an award of interest for a period prior to judgment is proper.
(Anselmo v. Sebastiani, 219 Cal. 292, 301-303 [26 P.2d 1] ;
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Maurice L. Rein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal.App.2d
670, 686-688 [321 P.2d 753].) As we have seen, section 8-706
provides as applicable here that the subcontractor shall recover
his costs and a certain percentage for profit where the contractor terminates under the power it reserved in the contract. The
contract thus provides in effect that payment shall be made on
a cost-plus basis, and except for the possibility that certain
expenses are not subject to calculation, there does not appear
to be any reason to refuse to apply here the rule governing
cost-plus contracts generally.
MacIsaac &- Menke 00. v. Oardox Oorp., supra, 193 CaLApp.
2d 661, 673-674, relied upon by defendant, does not establish a
contrary rule. The basis of damages in that case was the
, 'value" of extra work done under the peculiar circumstances
present, a~d the court pointed out that such circumstances
"precluded ascertainment of the cost of the work by computation. "
Among the items of expense attacked by defendant are the
, 'Engineering Burden" which is calculated as a percentage of
the cost of the engineering labor, the "Material Procurement
Burden" which is a percentage of direct materials and
outside engineering expense, and the "General and Administrative Expenses" which is a percentage of direct labor and
burden. Defendant does not now (and did not at the trial)
attack the amounts of these costs or the percentages used. The
percentages involved are fixed by government auditors as the
share that the project should bear of all of plaintiff's indirect
and overhead costs. These percentages are subject to periodic
audit by the government and change from time to time. It is
apparent that these items of expense are derived by calculation from costs incurred by plaintiff.
Defendant next urges that interest should not have been
awarded because plaintiff's original demand of damages
exceeded the amount awarded. The approximate net amount of
the excess was around $7,000. The reasons for this excess were
that after the original demand there was a minor adjustment
in the engineering burden percentage, a few matters were
omitted from the original demand in error, plaintiff was able
to settle some claims of its subcontractors for less than the full
amount of the claims, and plaintiff was able to salvage some
materials. [10] The mere fact that there is a slight difference between the amount of damages claimed and the amount
awarded does not preclude an award of prejudgment interest
(Koyer v. Detroit Fire &- Marine Ins. 00., 9 Ca1.2d 336, 345
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[70 P.2d 927]), and the erroneous omission of a few matters
from the account or erroneous ealculation of the costs do not
mean that the damages are not capable of being made certain
by calculation.
[11] With regard to the reduction in damages due to
settlement of claims and salvage of materials, it has been held
in an analogous situation that offsets of the defendant, even
where unliquidated, do not preclude the allowance of interest
on the balance of the plaintiff's claim (Hansen v. Covell, 218
Cal. 622, 629-631 [24 P.2d 772, 89 A.L.R. 670] ; McCowen v.
Pew, 18 Cal.App. 482,483 et seq. [123 P. 354] ; see Lineman v.
Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [195 P. 408, 4 A.L.R.2d 1380]),
and we are satisfied that reductions in damages due to plaintiff's efforts to mitigate damages should not preclude an
award of prejudgment interest. If the rule were otherwise, a
plaintiff might be encouraged to forego opportunities to mitigate damages so as not to jeopardize his right to prejudgment
interest.
The percentage of profit to be allowed is set forth in section
8-706, and defendant's contention that the profits to be allowed
may not be:determined by calculation is also without merit.
Defendarit also urges that no interest is recoverable on a
termination claim under section 8-706. This contention is based
on cases which disallow claims of interest against the government. Obviously defendant is not the government, and so the
cited cases are not applicable.
[12] There is merit, however, in defendant's contention
that the court erred insofar as it awarded interest from the
date of termination on the portion of the damages, approximately $18,000, attributable to settlement" expenses. Although
section 8-706 allows recovery of the cost of expenses reasonably
necessary to the preparation of settlement claims, these
expenses were obviously not incurred until after the date of
termination. Interest is not intended to be a windfall. Interest
on this portion of the award should date only from the jm}gment.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to
make findings on 66 matters although requested by defendant
to do so. The counterfindings filed by defendant and its objection to the proposed findings total almost 70 pages. In many "
respects the counterfindings and objections are directly or
impliedly contrary to the findings made by the court, relate
merely to evidentiary matters, or deal with immaterial
matters. At the end of the counterfindings and objections,
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defendant "requests specific findings of fact and conclusions
of law on all of the issues, both of fact and of law, which are
raised by and which are the subject of and which are included
in the Counter-Findings and Counter-Conclusions set forth
herein." No other specification was made as to the issues upon'
which defendant sought additional findings.
[13] We have examined the findings of the trial court in
the light of the criticisms made in defendant's brief and are
satisfied that the findings sufficiently dispose of all of the basic
issues raised. The findings proposed by defendant, insofar as
they" may be deemed additional findings and are not directly
contrary to the findings made, deal with evidentiary matters
fmd, even if the matters therein were found in favor of
defendant, would not require judgment in its favor. Section
634 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not require that a
finding be made as to every minute matter on which evidence
is received at the trial, and under the circumstances the
refusal of the court to make specific findings on every matter
proposed in defendant's counterfindings does not require a
reversal of the judgment.2
The judgment should be modified by eliminating the award
of interest prior to judgment on the settlement expenses. The
trial court "is directed to modify its judgment accordingly,
and, as so modified, the judgment and order appealed from"are
affirmed. Plaintiff to recover its costs on appeal.
McComb, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and White, J.,. concurred.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent.
In my opinion, the parties attempted to enter into a formal
2Section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
, 'In all cases where findings are" to be made, a copy of the proposed
findings shall be served upon all parties to the action and the court shall
not sign any findings therein prior to the expiration of 10 days atter such
service. The court may direct a party to prepare findings.
, 'Within 10 days after such service any other party may serve and file
objections, counterfindings and requests for special findings.
"If upon appeal or upon a motion under Section 657 or 663 of this
code it appears that the court has not made findings as to all facta
necessary to support the judgment, or that the findings are ambiguous
or conflicting upon a material issue of fact, the court before which such
appeal or motion is pending shall not infer that the trial court found in
favor of the prevailing party on such issue if it appears that the party
attacking the judgment made a written request for a specific finding on
such issue either prior to the entry of judgment or in conjunction with
a motion under Section 663 of this code.' I
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assipmont by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
" .
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contract and erroneously believed that they had done so. Certain essential elements were left to future agreement, however,
and an agreement "'as never reached.
The majority opinion applies the "essential element" test,
long used exclusively to determine the enforceability of agreements to agree, not to determine the enforceability of such an
agreement, but to hold that agreement on new terms was a
condition precedent to plaintiff Coleman's duty to continue
performance under the contract. If there is no initial agreement on essential elements, however, there is no contract to
which a condition precedent can attach.
The only enforceable contract between the parties was the
one manifested by the five "go ahead" telegrams received and
acted upon by Coleman on June 24, 1959. The telegrams contained new proposals and were therefore counteroffers to Coleman's bid. (Civ. Code, § 1585; A.merican Aeronautics Corp. v.
Grand Central Aircraft Co., 155 Cal.App.2d 69, 80 [317 P.2d
694] ; Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston, 123 Cal.App.2d 300, 310
[266 P.2d 856] ; 1 Corbin, Contracts (1963 ed.) § 89, pp. 378382.) When new terms are proposed, no contract arises unless
the original offeror accepts the counteroffer. (Lawrence Block
Co. v. Palston, supra; Apablasa v. Merritt ({7 Co., 176 Cal.App.
2d 719, 726 [1 Cal.Rptr. 500].) If, as here, the offer specifies
no particular mode of acceptance and has as its object the
beginning of performance, the offeree's beginning of performance constitutes an acceptance. (Rest.2d Contracts (Tent.
Draft No.1) § 52, coms. b, c, pp. 216-218. See Logoluso v.
Logoluso, 233 Cal.App.2d 523, 529 [43 Cal.Rptr. 678] ; Standard Iron Works v. Globe Jewelry ({7 Loan, Inc., 164 Cal.App.
2d 108, 117 [330 P.2d 271]. Cf. Beatty v. Oakland Sheet Metal
Supply Co., 111 Cal.App.2d 53, 62-63 [244 P.2d 25].)
The telegrams made clear that final arrangements were still
to be made. Pending those arrangements, however, Coleman
was to. begin operations with the understanding that no more
than $40,000 worth of performance was presently authorized.
The terms of this agreement included the specifications which,
according to the findings, Coleman reasonably interpreted as
calling for a payload center of gravity at rail height.
The facts found by the trial court establish that no other
contract ever came into being between Coleman and North
American. On July 6, 1959, Coleman received from North
American the purchase orders referred to in the telegrams.
The . purchase orders stated that they became a binding
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contract on the terms set forth therein when C Caccepted either
by acknowledgment or delivery. . . . " The trial court erred
in construing this language to mean delivery of the purchase
orders to Coleman and in finding that a contract therefore
existed as of July 6.
It is a question of law whether the facts found gave rise to a
contract. (Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal.App.2d 711, 721 [197
P.2d 807].) The purchase orders, like the telegrams, contained
new and important terms and were therefore a new offer. 1 In
such a setting, the term "delivery" cannot reasonably be con·
strued as delivery of the purchase orders to Coleman, for such
a construction would have given North American the power to
close an agreement to which Coleman never assented merely by
delivering the terms to Coleman. (See Lawrence Block Co. v.
Pals ton, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d at p. 310.) "Delivery" must
therefore mean delivery of the specified items. Delivery of
goods is a mode of acceptance commonly recognized in
commercial dealings (see, e.g., Com. Code, § 2206), although in
this case such a means of acceptance was probably not contem.
plated because of the length of time required for performance.
The contract also provided for acceptance by c, acknowledg- .
ment" of receipt of the purchase orders, and acknowledgment
copies were provided. 2
On July 15, the president of Coleman acknowledged the
purchase orders by signing and sending them to North American. Ordinarily this action would be an acceptance by
Coleman of all the terms of the contract. According to the
findings of the trial court, however, "on July 7, 1959, at a
conference between engineers of defendant [North American]
lThe original invitation to bid sent to Coleman by North American
stated c, If you are the successful bidder, you will be offered a purchase
order. • • . I I (Italics added.)
2Although each purehase order sent to Coleman contained in small
print the recital that it would become a binding contraet when accepted
"either by acknowledgment or delivery," it advised in much larger
print, "PLEASE SIGN ACKNOWLEDGMENT or THIS PURCHASE ORDEB AND
RETURN IMMEDIATELY ATTENTION: PURCHASING DEPARTMENT." Aeeompanying each purchase order was a separate sheet entitled "ACKNOWLEDGMENT OJ' PURCHASE OlWER," providing space for the offeree-seIler's
signature over the repeated designation, "ACKNOWLEDOMENT--RETURN
IMMEDIATELY TO PURCHASING DEPARTMENT." Even more significantly,
each of the five" go ahead" telegrams received by Coleman on .July 24
declared that North American's contractual liability would be limited
to a specified figure "pending formal execution of confirming purchase
order and yO'Ur acknowledgment thereof" (italics added). In ascertaining the intent of parties to a contract the written portions, e.g., the
telegrams in the case at bar, control its printed portions, e.g., the mention
of "delivery" in the purchase order form. (Civ. Code, 11651.)
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and engineers of plaintiff [Coleman], defendant's engineers
for the first time informed plaintiff's engineers that defendant
desired the trailers to be designed with the payload center of
gravity 35 inches above the rail top surfaces." The court
further found that" After the conference on JUly 7, 1959,
defendant requested plaintiff to continue working on the
project, the subject matter of the contract, and stated that
changed specifications- would be forthcoming from defendant
to plaintiff" and that" At defendant's request, pursuant to
the contract between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff had
been performing work and rendering services for defendant
for defendant's use and benefit. . . ."
These findings and the testimony in the record are ambiguous as to whether, after the meeting of July 7, the parties had
"agreed that the '35-inch figure was to be followed, or had only
decided that the rail height figure was not the proper one. For
example, :Mr. Nolan, Coleman's project engineer in this case,
testified on direct examination:
"Q. Mr. Nolan, so far as the engineering department, you
were the project engineer, is it or is it not true that there was
no final decision between North American and Coleman as to
the location of the center of gravity of the payload so far as
you know' A. That's right. "
The witness further testified on direct examination:
" A. We said this is the way we're going to design it and
North American people said they wanted the CG, the load
factors applied to the CG with the height above the rail, the .
center of gravity which was a number that we didn't know
exactly how high the CG was.
"Q. Did North American say they knew' A. No, they
didn't know how high it was exactly but they knew it was in
the neighborhood of 36 inches and so it was arranged . . . to.
be phoned back. "
On cross-examination, :Mr. Nolan testified further regarding
the meeting:
"Q. And then, that same afternoon, Mr. Burcombe telephoned you and gave you 35.25 inches CG height above the
rails YA. Yes. . . .
"Q. You knew on July 7th, didn't you, that the Coleman
design placing the CG of the pay load at rail height and
applying the load factors at that point, would not meet the
side loads if the pay load CG were placed 35 inches above the
rails' . . . THE 'VITNESS: Yea."
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Mr. Burcombe, a North American project engineer, testified
on direct examination that at the July 7 conference Mr. Nolan
"brought up the matter of CG. He said their stress people had
been figuring that the CG was located at rail height and
having seen the missile, he knew intuitively that it was not at
rail height-that it was some distance above this, and he
requested us to determine or give him the figure of what it
should be. I knew it was somewhere in the neighborhood of 36
or 37 or 38 inches, but to be sure, I told him we would find out
for sure upon our return and call him back and give him an
exact figure and it was later confirmed in writing and upon
return to the North American plant we determined that it was
35.52 inches above the rails, which I phoned to him, and told
him that we had confirmed this. We eventually rounded it off
at 35 inche~. "
Whether or not a new center of gravity figure had been
finally agreed upon at this point, there would be no contract.
On the one hand it may be that the parties simply did not
know precisely where the center of gravity was to be located,
in which case there would be no agreement. On the other hand,
if the understanding was that the 35-inch figure was the
proper one, still tIl ere would be no agreement. Specifications
had not yet been supplied, time of performance had not been
agreed upon, and the very important price term remained to
be settled. The record makes clear that both parties were of the
opinion, even before JUly 15, that the precise location of the
payload center of gravity was to be an essential element of
their contract.s
Nothing in the record suggests that the parties agreed to go
ahead on the basis of the original rail-height specification until
SA Coleman interoffice memorandum dated July 8 states that placing
the payload center of gravity at 35 inches above the rails "will praetically double the loads on most of the members and cause most of the
stress work performed to date to be recalculated. A lot of redesign will
ha ve to be performed as a result of the increased member sizes, the
fabrication costs will increase due to material sizes increases, and the
schedule will suffer a delay.
"A cost estimate is being prepared for these changes and little work
can be performl>d that will not be affected by the above changes."
Coleman '8 project engineer, Mr. Nolan, testified that his opinion as of
July 8 was that if the payload center of gravity were to be placed at
35 inches above the rails it would "cause most of the stress work performed to date to be recalculated," "a lot of redesign would have to be
performed," "the fabrication cost will increase," "the schedule will
suffer a delay," and" little work [could] be performed that would not
he affected by the changes 011 this project." Mr. Nolan further testified
that the engineering necessary to place the payload center of gravity at
the point specified in the telephone call of July 8 "would be. entirely
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some formal change was made. In the interoffice memorandum
of July 8, Coleman instructed its contract administrator to
call North American's buyer" and ask him to send us a letter
or a change to the specifications defining where they want the
center of gravity, if not at the top of the load rails." (Italics
added.) Such an inquiry would have been meaningless had
Coleman actually intended to proceed with building a trailer
with the payload center of gravity at rail height.
Coleman's pleadings are also instructive. They indicate, not
that Coleman intended to proceed on a rail-height basis until
further notice, but that it planned to build the trailers according to some other specification-somewhere in the area of 35
inches above rail height-which was still to be supplied. In its
complaint Coleman alleged that "defendant orally informed
plaintiff that a change in specifications would be furnished so
that a trailer unit would be produced that would do the job
contemplated." Coleman further alleged that "Plaintiff, relying on the advice the defendant had previously given it, as
above alleged, had been proceeding on the contract for some
time on the basis of the changed specifications even bcfore the
written changed specifications were received." And in its pretrial statement, Coleman stated that "plaintiff, based on the
request of North American to proceed with the design and
engineering work, did proceed with this engineering and
design work to design a positioning trailer with the center of
gravity 35 inches above rail height. "
The understanding of North American in this regard is also
clear. The following testimony was elicited from Mr. Burcombe on cross-examination by Coleman:
"Q. Sir, would you have expected Coleman Engineering
after July 8th, 1959, to have made a drawing of the parts of
the positioning trailer with the CG at rail height, after the
conferences you had 7 A. We wouldn't expect them to, no.
" Q. You would have expected them to have been drafting
along the lines you suggested and requested, isn't that right Y
A. 'Designing to our interpretation of the specifications, placing CG at 35 inches above the top of the rail.
"Q. You certainly wouldn't expect them after that confer-

i
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different" from that required to build a trailer with a payload center
of gravity at rail height.
North American's project engineer, Mr. Burcombe, testifiec1 on crossexamination that the missing specification of a verticlll payload center
of &,ravity was an "important" and "very significant" dimension in
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ence to go ahead on the other interpretation, would you, sir!
A. I wouldn't expect them to, no.
"Q. It would have been a waste of time, isn't that right! A.
That's right. "
In these circumstances I cannot conclude that on JUly 15
Coleman intended to enter into a contract to build a trailer
according to its own design despite its knowledge that, in the
words of Coleman's own engineer, "it was not what they
[North American] wanted, that they wanted the design load
applied at a high CG, some distance above the rails." This
knowledge gained by the Coleman engineers at the July 7
meeting is, of course, imputed to the corporation (Ban/ran 00.
v. Rees Blow Pipe M/g. 00., 168 Cal.App.2d 191, 204-205 [335
P.2d 995] ; cf. Civ. Code § 2332).
Thus, w:hen the purchase orders were signed on July 15,
Coleman knew that the specification intended by North American was not for a payload center of gravity at rail height. In
signing the purchase orders with this knowledge, it could not
purport to accept an offer describing a center of gravity at rail
height. (17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 146, pp. 493-494;
3 Corbin, Contracts (1960 ed.) § 609; Ex parte Perusini Oonst.
00., 242 Ala. 632, 636 [7 So.2d. 576]. Cf. Lemoge Electric v.
County 0/ Ban Mateo, 46 Ca1.2d 659, 662-663 [297 P.2d 638] ;
Brunzell Oonstr. Oo~ v. G. J. Weisbrod, Inc., 134 Cal.App.2d
278, 286 [285 P.2d 989].) For the same reasons, North American could not maintain that Coleman had agreed to perform
according to new specifications but at the original bid price.
North American" was fully aware, before July 15, that Coleman
had bid on the basis of a payload center of gravity at rail
height and that Coleman's position was that changes would
be required in cost and price terms and in the time schedule.
The actions of both parties after July 15 demonstrated that
the price, time of performance, and specifications for the
center of gravity were not regarded as settled from the outset.
Both parties treated the contract as an agreement to agree,'
relying on the change clause of the purchase orders as a basis
for adjustment in specifications, price, and time of performance through future negotiations. After July 15 there were
numerous negotiations concerning these open terms.
4 In his opening statement to the trial court, Coleman's attomel stated:
"Now, have in mind, I know the eases are legend that holds [sicJ that an
agreement to hold in the future is no agreement at all •.. I wonder it
that is where we are. An agreement to agree. Assuming that's where we
are, then, of course, we will be left with a quantum meruit. • • ."
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Agreements to agree are valid and enforceable if unessential
elements only are reserved for the future agreement. "The
general rule is that if an 'essential element' of a promise is
reserved for the future agreement of both parties, the promise
gives rise to no legal obligation until such future agreement is
made." (Oity of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Ca1.2(1
423,433 [333 P.2d 745]. See lVong v. Di Grazia, 60 Ca1.2d 525,
539 [35 Ca1.Rptr. 241, 386 P.2d 817] ; Apablasa v. Merritt d';
Co., supra, 176 Cal.App.2d 719, 730; Putman v. Cameron, 129
Cal.App.2d 89, 95 [276 P.2d 102] ; Avalon Products, Inc. v.
Lentini, 98 Cal.App.2d 177, 179 [219 P.2d 485]; 1 Corbin,
Contracts (1963 ed.) § 29, pp. 84-85.)
Whether a term is "essential" "depends upon the relative
importance and the severability of the matter left to the
future; it is a question of degree. . . ." (Oity of Los Angeles
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 423, 433 [333 P.2d 745].) The
relative importance of a term may turn in part upon the
intentions of the p·arties. (See 1 Corbin, Contracts (1963 ed.)
§ 29, pp. 89-90.) When, however, "a contract is so uncertain
and indefinite that the intention of the parties in material
particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void and
unenforceable. " (California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union
Sugar Co., 45 Ca1.2d 474, 481 [289 P.2d 785, 49 A.L.R.2d 496].
See also Ellis v. KlafJ, 96 Cal.App.2d 471,478 [216 P.2d 15].)
At times, subsequent conduct of the parties may establish the
contours of an agreement that appeared uncertain at its inception and thus render it enforceable. (Bohman v. Berg, 54
Ca1.2d 787, 794-795 [8 Cal.Rptr. 441, 356 P.2d 185].) The
history of the Coleman-North American negotiations, however,
establishes just the contrary; the course of events magnified
and made clearer the original uncertainty of their agreement
and intentions concerning many essential details. Neither
design specifications, price, nor time of performance had been
agreed upon, nor were they ever finally agreed upon~ and the
parties' extended negotiations demonstrate that they deemed
both the specifications5 and price 6 to be essential. Since both
5Lack of agreement concerning specifications, especially where, as
here, they deal with the design of a major element constituting the object
of the contract, may vitiate any attempt upon the part of the parties to
have an enforceable agreement. (See Colorado Corp. v. Smith, 121 Cal.
App.2d 374, 376·377 [263 P.2d 79]; 1 Williston, Contracts (3d ed.)
I 42, :pp. 135·136; cf. Putman v. Cameron, 8upra, 129 Cal.App.2d 89,
95-96.>
6It has been held that when the price term is expressly left to be agreed
0$ C.2d-l.
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of these terms as well as the time of performance 7 were left to
future agreement, there can be no question that essential ele..
ments were left to be agreed upon. The open terms were the
very substance of the contemplated contract.
Under these circumstances, the change clause of the pur..
chase orders cannot give rise to a contract, for without an
initial agreement on the essential terms the:re are no standards
to govern the meaning of the change clause. The change clause
itself is then affected by the basic uncertainty that precludes
the existence of a contract. The parties may not invoke the
change clause, designed to meet unforeseen contingencies, to
make a contract when there has been no agreement from the
outset on essential matters.
Since no contract arose when Coleman acknowledged the
purchase orders, the trial court erred in awarding damages
pursuant' to the termination clause in those orders. When
performance is rendered by one party in the mistaken belief
that an enforceable contract exists, his remedy is in quantum
meruit. (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960 ed.) § 599, pp. 593-595,
fn. 22, citing Peerless Glass 00. v. Pacific etc. Co., 121 Cal.
641, 647 [54 P. 101].) Ordinarily, the measure of recovery is
the reasonable value of benefits conferred upon the other
party. (Ohallenge Oream &- Butter Assn. v._ Royal Dutch,
Dairies, 212 Cal.App.2d 901, 908 [28 Cal.Rptr. 448]; Townsend Pierson, Inc. v. Holly-Coleman 00., 178 Cal.App.2d 373,
378 [2 Cal.Rptr. 812] ; Major-Blakeney Oorp. v. Jenkins, 121
Cal.App.2d 325, 340 [263 P.2d 655].) If the other party
received no benefit, there is ordinarily no obligation to make
restitution. (Ibid.)
In the present case it does not appear that North American
benefited by Coleman's performance. Nevertheless, after the
upon, there is no contract until agreement is reached. (California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Uni01l. Sugar 00., supra, 45 Cal.2d 474, 481-482;
Avalon Products, Inc. v. Lentini, supra, 98 Cal.App.2d 177, 179-180;
Noel v. Dum01l.t Builders, Inc" 178 Ca1.App.2d 691, 696 [3 Cal.Rptr.
~20]; Beech Aircraft Oo-rp. v. Ross (lOth Cir. 1946) 155 F.2d 615, 618.)
Although this rule has been abrogated in the area of contracts for the
Rale of goods (Com. Code, § 2305), the comments to that section point
out that, at least in part, the change relies on other unique features of
the Uniform Commercial Code. (See Com. Code, § 2305; Uniform Com- ---mercial Code, com. 1.)
7 Although in the absence of a specified date, courts will imply a reasonable time for performance (Wong v. Di Grazia, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 525,
:i36), the absence of a specified time contributes to the uncertainty aa
to whether there was an agreement. (Compare HcmcOCM OU 00. v.
McClellMl, 135 Cal.App.2d 667, 670 [288 P.2d 39].)
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misunderstanding as to the center of gravity was discovered at
the JUly 7 conference, Coleman continued to perform at North
American's express request. Had the contemplated contract
envisaged the performance of services instead of the production of trailers, there would be no doubt that Coleman could
,recover the reasonable value of its work whether or not it
benefited North American. When one person performs services
at the request of another, the law raises an obligation to pay
the reasonable value of the services. (Williams v. Dougan, 175
Cal.App.2d 414, 418 [346 P.2d 241J.) The Restatement of
Restitution rationalizes this rule with the requirement that a
benefit can be conferred as a prerequisite to restitution by
stating that a benefit is conferred upon another if a person
."performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other,
. . . " (See Rest., Restitution, § 1, com. b, p. 12. Italics
added.) Although ,this rule has usually been applied when
services or work and labor were requested in their own right,
rather than as incidental to the construction of a specified item
to be sold to the defendant (see Williams v. Dougan, supra,
175 Cal.App.2d 414; Bodmer v. Turnage, 105 Cal.App.2d 475,
477-478 [233 P.2d 157]), there is no basis for limiting the rule
to the performance of services. If in fact the ~ performance of
services has conferred no benefit on the person requesting
them, it is pure fiction to base restitution on a benefit conferred. "[I]t is submitted that allowing a recovery in these
cases on a theory of benefit conferred is purely fictional, and
that the real basis is a moral obligation to restore to his original position a party who has acted to his detriment in reliance
on a representation, technically unenforceable, by another that
he will give value for the detriment suffered." (Note (1928)
26 Mich.L.Rev. 942, 943.)
In Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181 [139 A. 695, 59 A.L.R.
599], the court allowed the plaintiff recovery for services performed at the request of the defendant, explicitly recognizing
that no benefit was conferred upon the defendant. The defendant had agreed to buy the plaintiff's building and at the
defendant's request the plaintiff made alterations in the building in preparation for its transfer to the defendant. The
defendant refused to buy the building and the agreement was
held to be too indefinite for enforcement. The plaintiff was
nevertheless allowed to recover, the reasonable value of his
services, without regard to the fact that no benefit was conferred upon the defendant. The court held that recovery of the
)
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reasonable value of services. performed, without regard to
actual benefit, should be allowed "where the parties have
attempted to make a contract which is void because its terms
are too indefinite, but where one party has, in good faith, and
believing that a valid contract existed, performed part of the
services which he had promised in reliance upon it." (la. at
pp. 187·188.)
Kearf&S v. Anaree has been cited approvingly8 and has been
recently followed in another jurisdiction. (See Abrams v.
Financial8ervice Co., 13 Utah 2d 343,346 [374 P.2d 309].) In
my opinion, it should be followed here. When two parties
mistakenly believe that a contract exists between them, but the
agreement is too uncertain and indefinite to be enforced, the
one rendering performance and incurring expenses at the
request of the other should receive reasonable compensation
therefor' without regard to benefit conferred upon the other.
Such a rule places the loss where it belongs-on the party
whose requests induced performance in justifiable reliance on
the belief that the requested performance would be paid for.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case to the
trial court to determine the damages pursuant to the foregoing
rule.- :
Mosk, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
25, 1967. White, J.,. sat in place of Tobriner, J., who deemed
himself disqualified. Traynor, C. J., and Mosk, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.
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8See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960 ed.) § 599, p. 595, In. 22; Fuller &
Perdue, The ReliaftCtJ Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 Yale L.J.
(1937) 373, 395-396; Note (1928) supra, 26 Mich_L.Rev. 942, 943-944.
-Retired Associate Justice of tile Supreme Court sitting under assign--ment of the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

